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Abstract
Five decades of lie-detection research have shown that people’s ability to detect deception by observing behavior and listening to
speech is limited. The problem is that cues to deception are typically faint and unreliable. The aim for interviewers therefore is to
ask questions that actively elicit and amplify verbal and nonverbal cues to deceit. We present an innovative lie-detection perspec-
tive based on cognitive load, demonstrating that it is possible to ask questions that raise cognitive load more in liars than in truth
tellers. This cognitive lie-detection perspective consists of two approaches. The imposing-cognitive-load approach aims to make
the interview setting more difficult for interviewees. We argue that this affects liars more than truth tellers, resulting in more and
more-blatant cues to deceit. The strategic-questioning approach examines different ways of questioning that elicit the most dif-
ferential responses between truth tellers and liars.
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Five decades of lie-detection research have shown that people’s
ability to detect deception by observing behavior and listening
to speech is limited—with, on average, 54% of truths and lies
being correctly classified (Bond &DePaulo, 2006). To improve
accuracy rates, researchers have attempted to unravel the strate-
gies used by certain individuals identified as having extraordi-
nary lie-detection skills, so-called wizards (O’Sullivan &
Ekman, 2004). Is it the case that less sophisticated lie catchers
can learn from these wizards? Some scholars doubt whether
these identified individuals are real wizards (Bond & Uysal,
2007), and, to date, no publication has emerged about the strate-
gies these alleged wizards use (Bond, 2009). Other researchers
have taught investigators ‘‘diagnostic’’ cues to deceit. The
success of such training programs has been limited, with only
a few percentage points, on average, gained in accuracy (Frank
& Feeley, 2003).
The problem is that cues to deception are typically faint and
unreliable (DePaulo et al., 2003). One reason is that the under-
lying theoretical explanations for why such cues occur—
nervousness and cognitive load—also apply to truth tellers.
That is, both liars and truth tellers can be afraid of being disbe-
lieved and may have to think hard when providing a statement.
Can interviewers ask questions that actively elicit and amplify
verbal and nonverbal cues to deceit? Efforts in the past (e.g.,
Reid’s Behavior Analysis Interview) have concentrated on
eliciting and amplifying emotions (Vrij, 2008), but it is
doubtful whether questions that will necessarily raise more
concern in liars than in truth tellers can be asked (National
Research Council, 2003).
We will demonstrate, however, that it is possible to ask
questions that raise cognitive load more in liars than in truth
tellers. This cognitive lie-detection perspective consists of two
approaches. The imposing-cognitive-load approach aims to
make the interview setting more difficult for interviewees.
We argue that this affects liars more than truth tellers, resulting
in more and more-blatant cues to deceit. The strategic-
questioning approach examines different ways of questioning
that elicit the most differential responses between truth tellers
and liars.
The Imposing-Cognitive-Load Approach
Lying can be more cognitively demanding than truth telling
(Vrij et al., 2008). First, formulating the lie may be cognitively
demanding. A liar needs to invent a story and must monitor
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their fabrication so that it is plausible and adheres to everything
the observer or observers know or might find out. Moreover,
liars must remember what they have said to whom in order to
maintain consistency. Liars should also refrain from providing
new leads. Second, liars are typically less likely than truth tell-
ers to take their credibility for granted. As such, liars will be
more inclined than truth tellers to monitor and control their
demeanor in order to appear honest to the investigator, and
such monitoring and controlling is cognitively demanding.
Third, because liars do not take credibility for granted, they
may also monitor the investigator’s reactions carefully in order
to assess whether they appear to be getting away with their lie,
and this too requires cognitive resources. Fourth, liars may be
preoccupied with the task of reminding themselves to role-
play, which requires extra cognitive effort. Fifth, liars also have
to suppress the truth while they are fabricating, and this is also
cognitively demanding. Finally, while activation of the truth
often happens automatically, activation of the lie is more inten-
tional and deliberate, and thus requires mental effort.
A lie catcher could exploit the different levels of cognitive
load that truth tellers and liars experience in order to discrimi-
nate more effectively between them. Liars who require more
cognitive resources than truth tellers will have fewer cognitive
resources left over. If cognitive demand is further raised, which
could be achieved by making additional requests, liars may not
be as good as truth tellers in coping with these additional
requests.
One way to impose cognitive load is by asking interviewees
to tell their stories in reverse order. This increases cognitive
load because (a) it runs counter to the natural forward-order
coding of sequentially occurring events, and (b) it disrupts
reconstructing events from a schema (Gilbert & Fisher,
2006). Another way to increase cognitive load is by instructing
interviewees to maintain eye contact with the interviewer.
When people have to concentrate on telling their stories—
likely when they are asked to recall what has happened—they
are inclined to look away from their conversation partner (typi-
cally to a motionless point), because maintaining eye contact is
distracting (Doherty-Sneddon & Phelps, 2005). In two experi-
ments, half of the liars and truth tellers were requested to recall
their stories in reverse order (Vrij et al., 2008) or to maintain
eye contact with the interviewer (Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher,
2010), whereas no instruction was given to the other half of
the participants. More cues to deceit emerged in the reverse-
order and maintaining-eye-contact conditions than in the
control conditions. Observers who watched these videotaped
interviews could distinguish between truths and lies better in
the reverse-order condition and maintaining-eye-contact condi-
tions than in the control conditions. For example, in the
reverse-order experiment, 42% of the lies were correctly clas-
sified in the control condition, well below that typically
found in verbal and nonverbal lie-detection research, suggest-
ing that the lie-detection task was difficult. Yet, in the
experimental condition, 60% of the lies were correctly classi-
fied, more than typically found in this type of lie detection
research.
Strategic-Questioning Approach
Unanticipated questions
A consistent finding in deception research is that liars prepare
themselves when anticipating an interview (Hartwig, Granhag,
& Stro¨mwall, 2007). Planning makes lying easier, and planned
lies typically contain fewer cues to deceit than do spontaneous
lies (DePaulo et al., 2003). However, the positive effects of
planning will only emerge if liars correctly anticipate which
questions will be asked. Investigators can exploit this limitation
by asking questions that liars do not anticipate. Though liars
can refuse to answer unanticipated questions, such ‘‘I don’t
know’’ or ‘‘I can’t remember’’ responses will create suspicion
if the questions are about central (but unanticipated) aspects of
the target event.
To test the unanticipated-questions technique, pairs of liars
and truth tellers were interviewed individually about having
had lunch together at a restaurant (Vrij et al., 2009). While the
truth tellers did have lunch together, the liars did not but were
instructed to pretend that they had. All pairs were given the
opportunity to prepare for the interview. The interviewer asked
conventional opening questions (e.g., ‘‘What did you do in the
restaurant?’’), followed by questions about spatial details (e.g.,
‘‘In relation to where you sat, where were the closest diners?’’)
and temporal details (e.g., ‘‘Who finished their food first, you
or your friend?’’). Further, they were asked to sketch the layout
of the restaurant. The spatial questions and drawing requests
came as a surprise to interviewees (this was established after
the interview). Based on the overlap in responses between the
two pair members to the anticipated questions, the liars and
truth tellers were not classified above chance level. However,
based on the responses to the unanticipated questions, up to
80% of pairs of liars and truth tellers were correctly classified
(i.e., the answers to spatial questions and the answers to draw-
ings were less alike for the pairs of liars than pairs of truth tell-
ers). Asking unanticipated questions about central topics
therefore elicited cues to deceit.
Asking unanticipated questions can also be effective when
assessing individual interviewees rather than pairs of intervie-
wees. An interviewer could ask the same question twice. When
liars have not anticipated the question, they have to fabricate an
answer on the spot. A liar’s memory of this fabricated answer
may be more unstable than a truth teller’s memory of the actual
event. Therefore, liars may contradict themselves more than do
truth tellers. This approach probably works best if the questions
are asked in different formats. Truth tellers will have encoded
the topic of investigation along more dimensions than liars will
have. Truth tellers should therefore be able to recall the event
more flexibly (along more dimensions) than liars. When asked
to verbally describe and sketch the layout of a restaurant, truth
tellers’ verbal answers and drawings showed more overlap than
liars’ verbal answers and drawings (Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal, &
Mann, in press).
Drawings have never been used before as a lie-detection
tool, but they have potential, as demonstrated in two further
experiments. More so than a verbal request, the request to
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sketch forces the interviewee to convey spatial information.
That is, including an object within a drawing requires that
object to be spatially located. By comparison, verbally describ-
ing an object in a room can be done without indicating its spa-
tial location. If a liar has not experienced an item in a particular
location, he or she may still verbally describe the object but
will do so without referring to its location to avoid the risk of
misplacing it. Such a ‘‘masking strategy’’ is not possible when
asked to sketch. As a result, a liar may instead decide against
sketching the object. In an occupations experiment, truth tellers
discussed their real occupations, whereas liars discussed occu-
pations they pretended to have. When asked to verbally
describe the layout of their office, truth tellers’ and liars’
answers were equally detailed; however, when asked to sketch
the layout of their offices, liars’ drawings were less detailed
than were those of truth tellers (Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher,
in press).
In a second experiment, 31 ‘‘agents’’ were sent on a mission
during which they had to collect a decoder from another agent
(Vrij et al., 2010). After delivering the decoder, they were
asked to (a) verbally describe and later to (b) sketch what they
could see at the location where they had received the decoder.
Half of the agents were requested to lie and half to tell the truth.
The liars were asked to pretend to have been on a different mis-
sion in which they received the decoder at a different location.
Only 2 out of 16 (12.5%) liars included an agent from whom
they pretended to have received the decoder in their drawing,
whereas 12 out of 15 truth tellers (80%) included the real agent
in their drawing. In their verbal descriptions, again 2 out of
16 (12.5%) liars mentioned the other agent, whereas 8 out of
15 (53%) truth tellers did so. In other words, like the occupa-
tions experiment, truth tellers’ and liars’ drawings differed
more from each other than did truth tellers’ and liars’ verbal
recalls. Liars were inclined to omit the agent from the sketch
and verbal description for two possible reasons: First, the agent
had not been present at the location they sketched/described,
and therefore did not think about including him/her. Second,
liars may have been reluctant to include people in their draw-
ings/descriptions for fear of triggering further questions about
who those people actually were. Note that more truth tellers
sketched (80%) than verbally described the agent (53%),
demonstrating why drawings were more informative about
deception than verbal recalls. After sketching the stable ele-
ments, the truth tellers probably noticed that the agent was
missing from the drawing. Liars, however, will have been less
aware of this during their verbal recall, because of difficulties
in building a complete mental picture of their verbal recall.
Devil’s-advocate approach
Spatial and drawing requests are unsuitable when examining
lying about opinions. Determining the veracity of such concep-
tual representations can be important in security settings, as
demonstrated by the loss of seven CIA agents in Afghanistan.
They were killed via a suicide attack by a man they believed
was going to give them information about Taliban and
al-Qaeda targets in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The CIA was aware
that he had posted extreme anti-American views on the internet
but believed these to be part of a cover (Leal, Vrij, Mann, &
Fisher, in press).
The devil’s-advocate technique aims to detect deception in
expressing opinions. Interviewees are first asked an opinion-
eliciting question that invites them to argue in favor of their
personal view (‘‘What are your reasons for supporting the
U.S. in the war in Afghanistan?’’). This is followed by a dev-
il’s-advocate question that asks interviewees to argue against
their personal view (‘‘Playing devil’s advocate, is there any-
thing you can say against the involvement of the U.S. in
Afghanistan?’’).
People normally think more deeply about, and are more able
to generate, reasons that support rather than oppose their beliefs
(Ajzen, 2001). Therefore, truth tellers are likely to provide
more information in their responses to the true opinion-
eliciting question than to the devil’s-advocate question. This
pattern is unlikely to occur in liars, as for them, the devil’s-
advocate question is more compatible with their beliefs than is
the opinion-eliciting question. In effect, for liars, the devil’s-
advocate approach is a set-up wherein they first lie when
answering the opinion-eliciting question and then are lured into
telling the truth when answering the devil’s-advocate question.
In an experiment, participants were asked to tell the truth or lie
about their views regarding issues they felt strongly about,
including the war in Afghanistan. Truth tellers’ opinion-
eliciting answers were longer than their devil’s-advocate
answers, whereas no differences emerged in liars’ answers to the
two types of question (Leal et al., in press). Based on this prin-
ciple, 75% of truth tellers and 78% of liars could be classified
correctly.
The strategic use of evidence (SUE)
Lying and truth-telling suspects enter police interviews in dif-
ferent mental states (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). A guilty sus-
pect will often have unique knowledge about the crime, which,
if recognised by the interviewer, makes it obvious that he or she
is the perpetrator. The guilty suspect’s main concern will be to
ensure that the interviewer does not gain that knowledge. Inno-
cent suspects face the opposite problem, fearing that the inter-
viewer will not learn or believe what they did at the time of the
crime. These different mental states result in different strate-
gies for liars and truth tellers (Hartwig et al., 2007). Guilty sus-
pects are inclined to use avoidance strategies (e.g., in free
recall, avoiding mentioning where they were at a certain time)
or denial strategies (e.g., denying having been at a certain place
at a certain time when directly asked). In contrast, innocent sus-
pects neither avoid nor escape but are forthcoming and ‘‘tell the
truth like it happened’’ (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008).
In the SUE technique, the investigator aims to detect these
differential strategies via a strategic use of the available evi-
dence (e.g., possible incriminating information). The purpose
of SUE is to ask open questions (e.g., ‘‘What did you do last
Sunday afternoon?’’) followed by specific questions (e.g., ‘‘Did
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you or anyone else drive your car last Sunday afternoon?’’)
without revealing that evidence (e.g., closed-circuit TV images
of the interviewee’s car driven in a specific location on that
Sunday afternoon). Truth tellers are likely to mention driving
the car on that Sunday afternoon either spontaneously or after
being prompted (e.g., ‘‘tell the truth like it happened’’ strategy).
Liars are unlikely to mention driving the car spontaneously
(e.g., avoidance) or after being prompted (e.g., denial).
A denial will contradict the evidence.
Hartwig, Granhag, Stro¨mwall, and Kronkvist (2006) experi-
mentally tested the SUE technique. Prior to the experiment,
half of the interviewers were SUE trained and were instructed
to interview the suspect using the SUE technique. The remain-
ing interviewers were instructed to interview the suspect in the
style of their own choice. The untrained interviewers obtained
56.1% accuracy (similar to that typically found in nonverbal
and verbal lie detection research), whereas the SUE-trained
interviewers obtained 85.4% accuracy. Guilty suspects contra-
dicted the evidence more often than did innocent suspects, par-
ticularly when questioned by SUE-trained interviewers.
Final Thoughts
The lie-detection techniques that we have discussed can be
employed in various settings. SUE can be used when evidence
is available, and the devil’s-advocate technique can be
employed when examining the veracity of opinions. The other
techniques can be employed to determine the veracity of state-
ments about past activities but, in theory, also to determine the
veracity of statements about future activities (intentions). We
have shown that the unanticipated questions technique can be
employed to identify deceit in both individuals and networks
(multiple liars). Future research should examine whether the
techniques are sensitive to countermeasures—that is, liars’
attempts to fool investigators. The unanticipated-question tech-
nique should be immune to this, as its method is to ask ques-
tions that a liar has not anticipated and therefore not prepared
answers for. Due to individual differences in people’s
responses, within-subjects lie-detection techniques are pre-
ferred because they control for such individual differences. The
unanticipated-questions and devil’s-advocate techniques are
within-subjects techniques.
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